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ABSTRACT 
 
Whilst populism and technocracy are increasingly appearing as the two organizing poles of 
contemporary politics in western democracies, the exact nature of their relationship has not been the 
focus of systematic attention. In this paper, we argue that whilst these two terms – and the political 
realities they refer to – are usually as assumed to be irreducibly opposed to one another, there is also an 
important element of complementarity between them. This complementarity consists in the fact that both 
populism and technocracy are predicated on an implicit critique of a specific political form, which we 
refer to here as „party democracy‟, defining it as a political regime based on two key features: the 
mediation of political conflicts through the institution of political parties; and a procedural conception of 
political legitimacy according to which political outcomes are legitimate just to the extent that they are 
the product of a set of democratic procedures revolving around the principles of parliamentary 
deliberation and electoral competition. In order to advance this argument, we rely on a close analysis of 
works by Ernesto Laclau and Pierre Rosanvallon as exemplary manifestations of the contemporary cases 
for populism and technocracy respectively.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Two salient features of contemporary politics in Western democracies are increasingly 
capturing public attention. On one hand, we observe a growing concentration of power in the 
hands of a set of unelected „regulatory bodies‟, drawing their legitimacy primarily from their 
technical competence and administrative expertise (Majone 1996; Scharpf 1999; Fischer 2009; 
Valbruzzi and McDonnell 2013). On the other hand, we see the emergence and widespread 
success of a variety of so-called „populist‟ movements and parties, appealing directly to „the 
people‟ in order to mobilize opposition against established institutions and elites (Canovan 
1999; Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000; Arditi 2005; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Muller 2013; 
Urbinati 2014).  
Both these developments challenge the pertinence of the „Left/Right‟ distinction as the 
principal axis of political confrontation. In the last round of European elections, for instance, 
much of Marine Le Pen‟s campaign in France was run on the idea that her party is „neither left- 
nor right- wing‟ (“ni de droite ni de gauche”) but rather interested in reasserting the values of 
„popular sovereignty‟ and „national self-determination‟ against what she routinely refers to as 
the „European technocracy‟ (Le Pen 2012). Beppe Grillo in Italy and the Podemos movement in 
Spain have similarly gained widespread support by advancing the idea that the traditional 
Left/Right distinction is obsolete and ought to be replaced by a new structuring opposition 
between the „people‟ and „la casta‟ (Grillo and Casaleggio 2011; Iglesias and Rivero 2014).  
Mirroring their populist opponents, so-called „technocrats‟ have been eager to present 
themselves as non-partisan and committed to providing „pragmatic‟ solutions to political 
problems. In a book published in 2012, the former Italian Prime Minister, Mario Monti, and a 
current member of the European Parliament and former employee of the European Commission, 
Sylvie Goulard, presented the current crisis of European institutions as a consequence of the 
“short-termism” and “irresponsibility” of “populist” politics. The book concluded that “it is not 
through a demonization of expertise, but through a correct combination of technocracy and 
democracy that public policy can achieve a better temporal pertinence” (Monti and Goulard 
2012).  
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This conflict between populism and technocracy is also a reoccurring theme in the 
United States, with several commentators stating explicitly that it is progressively replacing the 
Left/Right distinction as the principal axis of political identification (e.g. Kenneally 2009; 
Freedland 2010; Williams 2011). Along similar lines, in the second volume of his latest book on 
Political Order and Political Decay, Francis Fukuyama has characterized the United States as a 
“state of courts and parties” where technocratic and populist elements are combined in 
destructive and dangerous ways (Fukuyama, 2014).  
Whilst technocracy and populism are thus increasingly appearing as the two organizing 
poles of the contemporary political landscape, the exact nature of their relationship has not been 
the focus of much attention. The governing assumption underscoring much of the contemporary 
discourse is that these two notions are irreducibly opposed to each other. An obvious reason for 
this is that the terms are generally used negatively, as labels with which „populist‟ figures 
excoriate their „technocratic‟ opponents and vice versa. Beyond political invective, however, 
scholars and commentators have also treated these forms of discourse as being in direct conflict 
with one another. In an article taking stock of the multiple dimensions of the ongoing European 
crisis, Mark Leonard described populism and technocracy as “two contradictory and mutually 
reinforcing forces”. “The EU”, he wrote, “has been the ultimate technocratic project … But, as 
the EU matured as a political project, its very success as a bureaucratic phenomenon fuelled a 
populist backlash at the national level” (Leonard 2011).  
In an article focusing on the domestic dimensions of the European crisis, Claus Offe has 
talked about a “deep divorce” between “politics and policy” in Europe (2013: 610). In his view, 
we have on the one side “populist mass politics… that has no perceptible implication for policy 
making on citizens‟ core interests” and on the other side “there is elitist policy making that has 
no roots in… nor legitimation through politics” (2013: 610). This depiction is reminiscent of a 
distinction drawn by Vivienne Schmidt in her 2006 book, Democracy in Europe, where she 
identified a growing tension between populism understood as “politics without policy” and 
technocracy defined as “policy without politics” (Schmidt 2006).  
The central argument we seek to advance in this paper is that beyond such evident 
dimensions of opposition between populism and technocracy, there is also an important element 
of complementarity between them, which so far has neither been studied nor thematized 
explicitly. This complementarity consists in the fact that both populist and technocratic forms of 
4 
 
discourse are predicated on the critique of a specific political form, which we refer to as party 
democracy. Whilst this term has been taken up by scholars in a variety of ways, we define party 
democracy as a political regime based on two key features: the mediation of political conflicts 
through the institution of political parties; and the idea that the specific conception of the 
common good that ought to prevail and therefore be translated into public policy is the one that 
is constructed through the democratic procedures of parliamentary deliberation and electoral 
competition.
1
  
This complementarity, we argue, should not be taken to mean that party democracy 
exists as an intermediary institutional form, sitting midway on a spectrum extending from 
populism at one end to technocracy at the other. Rather than being construed as some sort of 
compromise or mixture of populist and technocratic strains, we identify in this article a series of 
internal analytical commonalities between populist and technocratic discourses which explain 
why both posit party democracy as an object of critique. 
2
 Our identification of a common 
critique of party democracy obviously raises the issue of this notion‟s normative desirability. For 
the purposes of this paper, however, we leave this dimension to one side. We focus instead on 
the purely analytical point that, despite their ostensible opposition, there is also a significant and 
hitherto unstudied degree of convergence between populism and technocracy consisting in their 
shared opposition to party democracy. 
To substantiate this thesis, the paper is divided into three parts. In the first, we clarify the 
specific definition of party democracy we will be using by contextualizing it within a growing 
body of contemporary political theory literature that has sought to emphasize the normative 
significance of parties and partisanship within a democratic framework. In the second part, we 
focus on the notion of populism through an engagement with Ernesto Laclau‟s recent work on 
this topic. The aim of this part is to show that the normative appeal of populism depends on an 
implicit repudiation of the idea of party democracy. In the third part, we analyze Pierre 
Rosanvallon‟s recent work on democratic legitimacy and show that contemporary arguments for 
technocracy also rest upon a sustained critique of party democracy. In our selection of the works 
of Laclau and Rosanvallon, we believe we have identified two texts that are exemplary of 
broader tendencies within the field of contemporary political theory. By this, we do not of 
course refer to an idea of statistical or scientific sampling. Rather, we use the term „exemplary‟ 
                                                 
1
 See, for instance, Manin, 1997, 206-218. For an extended and recent discussion, see Mair, 2014, 513-596.  
2
 We thank one of the reviewers for helping us sharpen this particular point. 
5 
 
in a sense closer to what Kant defines the notion of an example in his third Critique. There he 
explains that a particular case can “stand in” for a general logic, because it “illustrates” it in a 
paradigmatic fashion.
3
 In what follows, we accordingly do not aim to make an exhaustive 
analysis of all the texts employing the notions of populism or technocracy within the field of 
contemporary political theory. Rather, we focus on two authors whose texts usefully illustrate 
the way in which the notions of populism and technocracy are used and understood in 
contemporary theoretical discourse. Our discussion of Laclau and Rosnavallon is directed by 
our interest in what their respective views on populism and technocracy can tell us about the 
relationship between these two phenomena. We are thus aiming to provide a contextualized 
account of their ideas rather than to undertake any exhaustive exegesis of their work as a whole. 
 
 
I/ THE DEFINITION OF PARTY DEMOCRACY 
The term party democracy has typically been associated with the transition away from 
19
th
 century parliamentarism as a consequence of the growing enfranchisement of European 
societies (Maier 1981; Manin 1997). As such, attention has been drawn towards the sociological 
roots and internal institutional dynamics of the term‟s main actors, the mass parties of the left 
and right (Duverger 1951; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In this paper, we focus on what we 
consider to be the analytical core of party democracy, presenting it as a particular instantiation 
of a constitutive tension of democratic political life: the tension between particular interests on 
one hand, and an overarching idea of the common good on the other. In developing our account 
of party democracy, we draw on the burgeoning interest in parties from within the field of 
political philosophy and what this work has added to the interest in parties already manifest in 
political science.
4
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 For a fuller discussion of this way of understanding the notion of exemplarity see Ferrara 2008 
4
 Though still very much neglected by political philosophers, political parties and partisanship have recently 
become the subject of a sustained and sophisticated interest on the part of some theorists (Bader and Bonotti, 2014; 
Bader, 2014; Goodin, 2008; Muirhead, 2006; Muirhead and Rosenblum, 2006; Rosenblum, 2008; White and Ypi, 
2010a, 2010b; White, 2014). Whilst taking its inspiration for the above account of party democracy from this 
growing body of work, this paper puts less of an accent upon the subjective aspect of parties and partisanship. For 
example, Muirhead (2006) writes about the “party spirit” and stresses that what matters are not the unintended 
functions of party machines but rather the willed actions of partisans themselves (2006: 718). He also uses the 
language of “virtue”, “sympathy” and stresses that partisanship is a behavioral disposition towards compromise and 
the need for “give and take” in a democracy (2006: 719). White and Ypi (2010a) are also interested in particular in 
what they call a “democratic ethos” and the role of parties in constructing this “positive conviction” among citizens 
regarding their abilities as political agents (2010a: 809). This paper‟s account of party democracy is more focused 
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We define party democracy as a political regime based on two key features: the 
mediation of social conflict through the institution of the political party, understood as a means 
for the articulation of particular interests into comprehensive – although competing – 
conceptions of the common good; and the idea that the specific conception of the common good 
that ought to prevail and therefore be translated into public policy is the one that is 
simultaneously constructed and identified through the democratic procedures of parliamentary 
deliberation and electoral competition, which is often but not always based on majority rule. 
Thus, schematically, we can say that party democracy is composed of two key analytical 
features: political mediation, and a procedural conception of political legitimacy.  
The idea of political mediation refers to an issue that is at the heart of both empirical and 
theoretical accounts of political parties. In the work of Maurice Duverger, Eric Schattschneider 
and Giovanni Sartori, for instance, it is common to find metaphors that seek to express the 
manner in which parties translate societal cleavages into partisan positions able to mobilize 
electorates. Sartori used the term “transmission belt” (1976), while Duverger wrote of parties 
“crystallizing”, “coagulating”, “synthesizing” and “molding” social divisions (1954). More 
recently, Muirhead and Rosenblum have deployed the metaphor of the “bridge”, arguing that 
parties do “unique political work” in a democracy by acting as “points of connection” between 
the political and non-political domains of social life (2006: 104). Matteo Bonotti also develops 
this point at length, dwelling on the “bilingualism” of political parties, meaning their ability to 
speak the languages of both civil associations and of state institutions (Bonotti, 2011: 20). 
What recent political theoretical writing has stressed, however, is that parties also go 
beyond merely acting as “transmission belts” between society and the state. They also, as 
Muirhead and Rosenblum put it, “create the terms of contest” (2006: 103). Of course, they do 
not create divisions entirely ex nihilo. In constructing their partisan positions they rely upon 
existing divisions within society. However, an important function they also perform is that of 
integrating a plurality of particular interests and molding them into an overarching conception 
of the common good. This requires transforming the views and interests that isolated individuals 
or groups within society hold prior to being integrated in the political process. Political parties 
thus function as intermediary bodies between society and the state in the sense that they both 
                                                                                                                                                            
on its analytical features, identifying it as a particular institutional solution to the problem of the relation between 
whole and part in democratic political life. 
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„reflect‟ social divisions present at the level of material and ideal interests, and „constitute‟ them 
politically into competing visions of the common good. 
This is implied by White and Ypi when they refer to parties as systems of “ideas-based 
cooperation between representatives across issues” (2010: 816), arguing that they play the role 
of “catalysts for political agency” by drawing links between disparate issues, and constituting 
them into normative representations of the common good. Relevant here is the language of the 
„whole‟ and the „parts‟. From this perspective, party democracy represents not the 
disappearance of the tension between particular interests and the public good but rather its 
institutionalization at the level of political society. In contrast to Muirhead and Rosenblum, who 
argue that the “ethical partisan” will strive to “stand for the whole, well-ordered society”, we 
suggest – as do White and Ypi – that party democracy is a regime based around the irreducible 
tension between the whole and the part, with parties standing for what Charles Maier refers to 
as the “legitimation of the partial good” (1981: 29). 
 
The second key feature of party democracy is its procedural conception of political 
legitimacy. What this means is that the outputs of party democracy as a political regime are 
considered legitimate not because they approximate to some pre-political conception of „truth‟ 
or „justice‟, but rather because they are generated through a specific set of procedures that are 
taken to be expressive of the constitutive values of democracy i.e. freedom and equality, usually 
embodied in the principles of parliamentary deliberation and a set of decision-making rules. 
Originally developed as a theme by Hans Kelsen in his treaty on The Essence and Value of 
Democracy (2013), the same idea was taken up more recently by Nancy Rosenblum through her 
conceptualization of partisanship as a form of “regulated rivalry” (2008: 20). What 
Rosenblum‟s account adds to Kelsen‟s is a greater emphasis on the specific kind of ethos that 
this conception of “regulated rivalry” supposes. For her, this is an ethos based on the 
recognition of the „partiality‟ of one‟s own conception of the good, and therefore on the 
willingness to search for compromise in political deliberation. Similarly, White and Ypi have 
also insisted on the “motivational” dimension of partisanship, arguing that while on one hand 
parties provide structures for political mobilization, on the other hand they serve to inscribe 
political engagement within a framework based on reciprocal respect and toleration (2010: 823). 
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As was observed in particular by Richard Hofstadter in his historical account of the 
formation of the US party system (1969), all of the above implies that the concept of party 
democracy is inextricably tied to the idea of a “legitimate opposition”, which is foreign to most 
other kinds of political regimes. Together with the concept of political mediation, this idea of 
proceduralism as involving recognition of the legitimacy of opposition will provide the basis for 
the ensuing analysis of populism and technocracy and their overlapping critique of the notion of 
party democracy. 
 
 
II/ FROM PARTISANSHIP TO HEGEMONY: ERNESTO LACLAU‟S THEORY OF 
POPULISM  
 
Ernesto Laclau‟s theory of populism is given the most comprehensive treatment in his 
highly influential book On Populist Reason (2005). Much of the success of this text is due to the 
fact that Laclau is one of the few authors within the field of contemporary political theory (and 
science) who does not start from the assumption that populism must necessarily be seen as the 
symptom of a „pathology‟ of existing democratic regimes. On the contrary, he attempts to show 
that the logic of populism is already engrained in the structural grammar of politics itself. For 
this reason, his ideas have often been referred to, and sometimes even been appropriated 
explicitly by, several „really existing‟ populist movements both in Europe and elsewhere.5 
For our purposes, we find from a close reading of Laclau‟s work that his normative 
defense of populism rests on a strong critique of both the idea of political mediation and a 
proceduralist conception of political legitimacy. What is noteworthy about Laclau, however, is 
that this critique is itself presented as a critique of technocracy and depoliticization. Laclau‟s 
elaboration of the alternative to populism and his critique of it is in fact so all-encompassing 
that it includes within it all those features we identify with the notion of party democracy. 
The core of Laclau‟s theory of populism is the idea that it can be understood as a 
specific way of structuring the field of the political which displays three key characteristics. 
Firstly, the aggregation of a set of heterogeneous social grievances or “demands” through the 
establishment of a series of “equivalential links” between them. Secondly, the opposition of this 
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 On this point, see for instance Melenchon 2014 and Iglesias and Rivero 2014.  
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aggregated set of demands to an “antagonistic pole” represented as the main reason for their 
lack of fulfillment. Thirdly, the crystallization of this antagonism by means of a “hegemonic 
logic” whereby one particular demand, or set of demands, is made to „stand in‟ for the social 
whole. The overall result of these three operations is a structuring of the field of the political in 
terms of an overarching opposition between a hegemonic representation of the whole – for 
which the generic name is usually the „people‟ – and an antagonistic other, usually represented 
as an oppressive and parasitic „elite‟ (Laclau 2005: 117-120).  
Laclau contrasts this way of structuring the political self-understanding of society with 
what he calls the “logic of difference”. This consists in treating all individual social interests as 
separate “demands” addressed to the power that is taken to hold society together. The result is a 
conception of society as a “system for the solution of individual problems” which for Laclau 
can only be held together by a unified logic for dealing with them. Thus, for instance, he 
mentions the idea of “a society integrated entirely through the mechanisms of the welfare state” 
as “one in which only the differential logic would be accepted as a legitimate way of 
constructing the social” (2005: 78). He later adds that “the same can be said about 
„neoliberalism‟, since it also presents itself as a panacea for a fissureless society – with the 
difference that in this case the trick is performed by the market, not by the state” (2005: 79).  
Although Laclau presents these two alternative modes of structuring the social space – 
i.e. the „populist‟ division of society into a hegemonic representation of the people and its other, 
and the „differential‟ integration of society with reference to a unifying logic for dealing with 
demands – as an analytical categorization, it is clear that he is not normatively indifferent 
between them. The basic reason is that Laclau shares with Carl Schmitt the assumption that 
there is something inherently valuable in the structuring the political space in terms of a 
dichotomous distinction between „friends‟ and „enemies‟ (Schmitt 1921). Thus, when Laclau 
asserts that the „differential‟ integration of society in terms of a unifying logic such as that of 
the market or the welfare state amounts to a form of “depoliticization”, this is clearly meant to 
function as a critique. Conversely, the claim that the logic of populism is structurally engrained 
in the very grammar of politics is meant to alert us to a very important function that populism is 
capable of carrying out. Much of Laclau‟s intellectual project, pursued jointly with Chantal 
Mouffe, has in fact consisted in arguing that the political Left should take up this insight and 
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strategically deploy the concept of „hegemony‟ as a way of counter-acting the depoliticizing 
tendencies of the welfare state and of the market (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  
 
Taking Laclau‟s argument as a whole, we can therefore see it as a normative vindication 
of populism, based on the claim that populism is a way of preserving a sense of „political 
antagonism‟ in the face of the multiple tendencies towards „depoliticization‟ that Laclau takes to 
be implicit in the „differential‟ logics of the market and the welfare state. We thus find in Laclau 
a version of the idea, outlined in the introduction above, that the contemporary political 
spectrum is founded upon an opposition between a hyper-politicized form of „populism‟ and a 
depoliticized form of „technocracy‟, where what is at stake is the preservation of the possibility 
of politics itself.
6
 The normative force of Laclau‟s theory of populism thus rests upon this 
dichotomous presentation of the political field, where populism is the only alternative to a 
depoliticized and technocratic realm. What counts as belonging to this realm is, however, 
extremely expansive and contains within it those two elements we identify as central to party 
democracy: political mediation and a procedural conception of political legitimacy.  
With regards the first, Laclau very firmly rejects the concept of „mediation‟ as a way of 
making sense of how political identities can be created out of a plurality of heterogeneous social 
demands. For him, the concept of mediation is inextricably tied to a “totalizing Hegelian 
metaphysics” according to which all forms of social conflict or division can be “rationally 
sublated” into a higher unity which at the same time overcomes them and preserves them 
(Laclau 2005: 93). As should already be clear from the outline provided above, however, the 
concept of mediation we have been referring to need not necessarily be tied to such a 
metaphysics. It is rather merely a way of indicating that as well as „reflecting‟ underlying social 
cleavages, political parties also contribute in „shaping‟ them, by molding a plurality of disparate 
social interests into a unified, although particular, conception of the common good.  
                                                 
6
 This is in fact the way in which Laclau appeared to understand his own argument. In a comment on his own 
theory published a few years after On Populist Reason, he explained that “political practices” operate “at diverse 
points of a continuum whose two reductio ad absurdum extremes would be a institutionalist discourse, dominated 
by a pure logic of difference, and a populist one, in which the logic of equivalence operates unchallenged”. These 
two extremes, he felt, are “actually unreachable”: “pure difference would mean a society so dominated by 
administration and by the individualization of social demands that no struggle around internal frontiers – i.e. no 
politics – would be possible; and pure equivalence would involve such a dissolution of social links that the very 
notion of „social demand‟ would lose any meaning.” (Laclau 2008: 45). 
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What Laclau cannot take into account, owing to his rejection of the category of 
„mediation‟, is the process whereby individual interests and demands can also be transformed 
by the logic through which they are integrated with one another – that is, in other words, what 
White and Ypi refer to as the „normative‟ dimension of the process of construction of collective 
identities (White and Ypi 2010: 816). This is reflected in the fact that, for Laclau, the collective 
identity of the „people‟ is created by establishing a series of “equivalential links” between 
individual social demands. By implication, what binds them together is ultimately only their 
common opposition to what he calls an “antagonistic pole” (i.e. the idea of an „elite‟, or some 
kind of constitutive „other‟).  
This is the reason why Laclau is ultimately forced to recognize that even though 
populists aim at abolishing the specific social „elite‟ against which they define themselves, in 
reality they cannot do without it because in absence of such an “antagonistic pole” the populist 
conception of the people would immediately dissolve into its constituent parts. Having rejected 
the idea of mediation, populism thus functions essentially as a way of lumping together a series 
of unreconstructed social antagonisms. The idea of party democracy we have developed above, 
on the other hand, is predicated on the idea that political identities can be constructed 
„immanently‟ out of concrete social interests. This implies that they can subsist independently 
of each other, while at the same time recognizing their ineradicable partiality.  
A second key element of tension between Laclau‟s theory of populism and the specific 
conception of party democracy we outlined above lies in the role played within the framework 
of the former by the concept of „hegemony‟. As we already pointed out, this is defined by 
Laclau as a process through which a particular social demand, or set of demands, succeeds in 
„standing in‟ for a representation of the whole. This has the effect of portraying the political 
process as a zero-sum struggle between competing conceptions of the „whole‟. Within this 
framework, the concept of political deliberation in search for compromises with one‟s 
opponents‟ positions makes little sense. Hegemony, in short, is an all-or-nothing affair. In 
contrast, a key feature of the specific conception of party democracy we sought to outline above 
is that, while seeking to both articulate and defend a specific conception of the common good, 
the parties within it remain conscious of their partiality, and therefore open to the possibility of 
deliberating with their opponents and potentially also of integrating certain elements of their 
program into their own.  
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This has consequences for the way in which political opposition is understood. In a 
context in which the key axis of political division is between a hegemonic conception of the 
„whole‟ and an antagonistic „part‟, the political struggle is bound to be tainted by a moral 
dimension where the latter ends up being represented as either morally evil or normatively 
illegitimate a priori (Cf. Muller 2013). Thus, paradoxically, even though Laclau‟s theory of 
populism was initially conceived as a way of preserving a sense of the significance of political 
antagonism, its ultimate consequence is to undermine the legitimacy of political opposition as 
such, because in the face of a hegemonic representation of the „people‟ any form of political 
opposition or resistance is bound to be perceived as illegitimate.  
A third element of tension between Laclau‟s theory of populism and the notion of party 
democracy concerns the relative degree of importance given to „formal procedures‟, and in 
particular majority rule and individual rights. If there is no room for the mediation of social 
divisions, then a procedural account of political legitimacy becomes very difficult too. This is 
because such a procedural account rests upon the idea that political conflicts are stripped of any 
moral weight. „Good‟ political outcomes cannot be known in advance but are rather subject to a 
contingent process of constant renegotiation with the parties involved. It is from this conception 
of legitimacy that the idea of a legitimate political opposition, discussed above, emerges. For 
political parties in party democracy, ttheir degree of legitimacy is not independent of the 
procedures themselves and it is ultimately dependent upon their ability to win votes.  
In contrast to this, Laclau‟s own account of political opposition challenge the idea of 
there being any legitimacy in procedures themselves. Throughout Laclau‟s treatise on populism, 
the notions of „majority rule‟ and „individual rights‟ are almost never mentioned – except as a 
potential vector for the crystallization of a hegemonic identity, which for him is what happened 
on the occasion of the collapse of the Soviet regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe (when these 
ostensibly purely „formal‟ concepts became the rallying points for the construction of a counter-
hegemonic protest movement against the existing regimes) (2005: 171). 
What Laclau devotes much more space to is what he calls the “affective dimension” of 
the hegemonic logic whereby a specific part within the social system succeeds in „standing in‟ 
for the whole (2005: 101).
7
 This is reminiscent of an idea we find in the work of Carl Schmitt, 
                                                 
7
 An entire section of his book is in fact dedicated to an analysis of the Lacanian theory of desire formation, 
through which Laclau argues that all desire is ultimately desire for a return to the original state of „fullness‟ 
experienced in the mother‟s womb. On this basis, he contends that the performative „success‟ of any hegemonic 
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according to which the leader‟s capacity to „embody‟ the unity of the people need not be 
validated through formal procedures, but can rather be “made palpable” through a process of 
“collective acclamation” (Schmitt 1923). Indeed, Schmitt goes as far as to suggest that the 
formal procedures of voting and majority rule are strictly speaking incompatible with the idea of 
popular sovereignty, because they have the effect of dissolving the people‟s unity at the very 
moment in which it is supposed to manifest itself (2005: 16).  
Although Laclau does not explicitly endorse this rejection of majority rule, there appears 
to be nothing within the framework of his conception of populism which would in principle 
prevent it. Like Schmitt‟s idea of popular sovereignty, Laclau‟s conception of populism is 
predicated on a „hegemonic‟ conception of political representation as „embodiment‟. Laclau‟s 
work on populism should therefore be understood as a struggle between two rival conceptions 
of political life. However, this struggle is not between populism versus technocracy, as he 
implies, but rather between his notion of populist politics and a very broad alternative that is 
characterized by mediated political divisions and by conceptions of legitimacy that are „merely‟ 
procedural. In short, Laclau‟s defense of populism rests upon this posited conflict between 
populism and an alternative political space which can most accurately be described as party 
democracy. 
 
 
III/ TECHNOCRACY AGAINST PARTIES: PIERRE ROSANVALLON‟S DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMACY   
After having shown that Laclau‟s theory of populism is predicated on an implicit 
critique of party democracy, we now move on to argue something similar with respect to the 
notion of technocracy. For this purpose, we take Pierre Rosanvallon‟s book on Democratic 
Legitimacy, as our exemplary text (Rosanvallon 2011). 
This choice may seem surprising given that this text is presented as a case for 
“enriching” the way in which the notion of democratic legitimacy is ordinarily understood, by 
complementing it with additional conceptual tools intended to ensure that political outcomes 
                                                                                                                                                            
claim to represent the social whole depends on its capacity to reactivate this original desire for „fullness‟, while at 
the same time diverting it onto itself. For, as he puts it: “the desire to constitute a „people‟ … arises only when that 
original sense of fullness is experienced as lost, and partial objects within society (aims, figures, symbols) are so 
invested that they become the name of its absence” (Laclau 2005: 110-116). 
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correspond to the common good. Indeed, the starting point of Rosanvallon‟s reasoning is the 
assumption that democratic legitimacy is based on the notion of “popular sovereignty” (2011: 5-
9). However, what Rosanvallon also takes for granted is that the „people‟ is an abstract entity, 
which never materializes concretely.
8
 From this he deduces that democratic regimes must rely 
on a plurality of different ways of representing it, combined in such a way that the interplay 
between them produces a more adequate representation of the common good than if only one 
such mechanism were employed (Rosanvallon 2011: 9-11).  
The reason we maintain this can be read as an argument for technocracy is that amongst 
the various kinds of representative mechanisms that Rosanvallon discusses as means for 
obtaining a more adequate representation of the common good, there are at least two that he 
explicitly links to the notion of technocracy. The first is what Rosanvallon refers to as the 
“legitimacy of identification with generality”, which corresponds to the idea of an independent 
bureaucracy as a separate pillar of democratic legitimacy, aside from electoral representation 
(2011: 33-39). Rosanvallon writes, for instance, that: “The neologism technocracy was coined 
[during the period of creation of independent bureaucracies] to denote a system of government 
in which experts organize and control the nation‟s resources for the good of all” (2011: 48).  
The second „technocratic‟ element of Rosanvallon‟s overall conception of democratic 
legitimacy is what he refers to as the “legitimacy of impartiality”, linking it in particular to the 
recent proliferation of independent and non-elected regulatory bodies such as “independent 
central banks”, “expert commissions” and “non-partisan authorities” (2011: 87-92). In the 
chapter devoted to the discussion of „independent authorities‟, for instance, Rosanvallon 
concedes that for many of their early critics, these agencies “with their certainty of representing 
the public good against special interests, stood as symbols of technocratic and bureaucratic 
arrogance” (2011: 83). 
To the extent that Rosanvallon‟s case for “enriching” the means of democratic 
representation involves defending the normative legitimacy of such institutions, we can say that 
he understands democracy not just as a form of government by the people, but also as 
government for the people. What is especially noteworthy about Rosanvallon‟s way of making 
this case is that he does not present it as an argument against the democratic idea of popular 
sovereignty but rather as a way of fulfilling it more effectively. The key difference with 
                                                 
8
 For a more detailed exposition of this point, see Rosanvallon 1998. 
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ordinary theories of popular sovereignty, however, is that Rosanvallon does not understand the 
functional differentiation between different instances of popular representation as a 
„hierarchical‟ distinction, which preserves the sense of a supremacy of the elected assembly, but 
rather as a „horizontal‟ division of powers which are assumed to compete with each other by 
advancing different claims towards the representation of the same social whole. In this way, 
non-elected and „technocratic‟ bodies such as independent bureaucracies and expert authorities 
effectively end up sharing sovereign power with elected representatives (2011: 10). It is worth 
noting that this very same argument is made by Giandomenico Majone in his account of the 
European Union, a „technocratic‟ body par excellence.9 
Another aspect of Rosanvallon‟s argument that is also very relevant to the argument of 
this paper is that, especially in his writings prior to the treatise on Democratic Legitimacy, 
Rosanvallon was keen to present the “complexity” that characterizes his conception of popular 
sovereignty in antithesis to – and indeed even an antidote against – the “simplification” that for 
him lies at the core of populism, itself assumed to consist in the idea that a unified and 
monolithic „people‟ can be adequately represented by a single instance of political 
representation, whether that be a single individual, an elected assembly, or even a collective 
logic such as that of public demonstrations (Rosanvallon 2010). This suggests that, within the 
logic of Rosanvallon‟s thought, it is possible to find the same structuring opposition between 
„technocracy‟ and „populism‟ which we also found to be at the heart of Laclau‟s thought – 
although the normative valence the two authors attach to these terms is reversed. 
A closer reading of Rosanvallon‟s text on Democratic Legitimacy reveals that the main 
target of its critique is in reality not just populism, but a broader conception of democracy that 
                                                 
9
 In the context of Rousseau‟s original theorization of the notion of popular sovereignty, for instance, the 
„executive‟ (i.e. what he calls the “government”) is a “delegated” power, which accordingly remains subordinate to 
that of the popular assembly (Rousseau 1997). Within the framework of Rosanvallon‟s theory of democratic 
legitimacy, on the other hand, popular sovereignty is effectively relocated at the level of the interplay between 
several competing instances of popular representation. This explains why, towards the end of his treatise on 
Counter-Democracy Rosanvallon had already suggested that democratic theory should recover the classical 
republican ideal of a „mixed constitution‟: “The idea of a mixed constitution – he write – arose in the Middle Ages 
in the course of the search for a regime that would combine the best features of aristocracy, democracy, and 
monarchy to create a polity as generous as it was rational.
 
This idea is worth revisiting today, but with a somewhat 
different twist: democracy itself needs to be understood as a mixed regime, not as the result of a compromise 
between rival principles, such as liberty and equality, but rather as a composite of the three elements described 
above” (Rosanvallon 2008: 314). This attempt to revisie the older notion of the „mixed constitution‟ and „mixed 
government‟ is at the heart of Majone‟s work on the European Union as a regulatory state. Majone distinguishes 
between the model of the separation of powers based on the principle of popular sovereignty and a „mixed 
government‟ model based upon the representation of interests. See Majone, 2005: 46-51. 
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overlaps in many significant ways with the notion of party democracy as we have defined it. In 
fact, it is surprising to note that, after having been at the center of many of his previous 
reflections, the term „populism‟ is mentioned only twice – and in passing – in Rosanvallon‟s 
book on Democratic Legitimacy. Far greater attention is instead devoted to the problems of 
majoritarian democracy, what he calls the “legitimacy of establishment” and what he claims is 
the bedrock of the way in which democratic legitimacy is ordinarily understood (Rosanvallon 
2011: 17). In order to uncover what lies at the heart of Rosanvallon‟s case for technocracy it is 
therefore necessary to examine a little more closely how he understands this “legitimacy of 
establishment” and the reasons he finds it so problematic.  
 
The key assumption at the core of what Rosanvallon calls the “legitimacy of 
establishment” is that “a majority vote establishes the legitimacy of government” (2011: 1). He 
finds this problematic because this idea relies on an “equivocal fiction”: that the majority is 
somehow equivalent to the people as a whole. Referring to the reasoning employed by the Abbé 
de Sieyès to justify the principle of majority rule, Rosanvallon writes that: “If individuals are 
free and equal by nature, legitimate power can arise only from the unity of individual wills. But 
how are we to think of such unity? Sieyès resolved the problem by recourse to a fiction: the 
majority was said to be an equivalent of unanimity … The problem was that Sieyès failed to 
make it clear whether this was a necessary legal fiction (whose consequences for the relation 
between law and politics remained to be spelled out) or a substantive equivalence” (2011: 24).  
Employing language drawn from Laclau but reversing its normative valence, we can say 
that, for Rosanvallon, the majority principle rests on a „hegemonic‟ logic, in that it arbitrarily 
assumes that a „part‟ can stand in for the „whole‟. In contrast to Laclau, Rosanvallon takes this 
to be a weakness of majority rule. Thus, later he writes that “modern democratic regimes … 
were fragile from the beginning”, since “their establishment depended on a certain blindness as 
to their true nature” (2011: 31). This is also what underscores his further claim that the 
“legitimacy of establishment” needs to be “complemented” by other mechanisms for 
representing the people‟s will, which notably include the “legitimacy of identification with 
generality” and the “legitimacy of impartiality”.  
As we observed with respect to Laclau, this conception of democracy as an essentially 
„hegemonic‟ project is itself predicated on a blindness to the two key features of party 
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democracy. First of all, like Laclau, Rosanvallon assumes that majority rule is based on a logic 
of “equivalence” (i.e. the idea that the majority is equivalent to the whole). This ignores – and 
indeed excludes – the key function of political mediation played by political parties with the 
framework of really existing democratic regimes. What Rosanvallon does not seem to take into 
account in his characterization of the “legitimacy of establishment” is that when individuals 
vote in representative elections they do not usually express their preferences over a specific 
issue but rather manifest their support for one amongst various competing political projects, of 
which political parties are usually the vectors.  
From this perspective, majoritarian elections can be seen as part of a broader process 
through which an overarching conception of the „common good‟ is progressively extrapolated 
and defined out of the plurality of particular interests present within society (Kelsen 2013). 
Indeed, from the perspective of the specific conception of party democracy we sought to define 
above, this is a process that presupposes a prior process of political negotiation and articulation 
both within parties (to create collective – if partial – representations of the „common good‟) and 
between them, usually resulting in „compromise solutions‟, whose aim is to satisfy as many of 
the particular interests present within society as possible. By reducing the “legitimacy of 
establishment” to the idea of an “equivalence” between majority rule and popular sovereignty, 
Rosanvallon arbitrarily brushes aside the whole dimension of political mediation carried out by 
political parties within the framework of party democracy.  
This is reflected in the way in which political parties are portrayed in Rosanvallon‟s 
book. Consistently, they appear as vectors for “special interests” and “particularistic concerns”, 
thereby effectively eliding the conceptual difference between them and „interest groups‟ or 
„lobbies‟. In the context of his discussion of the factors that led to the formation of independent 
bureaucracies as ways of compensating for the inherent deficiencies of the “legitimacy of 
establishment”, for instance, Rosanvallon writes that: “political parties were instruments not for 
representing the public interest, but for enabling private interests to capture the public space” 
(2011: 37). Later, he also adds that this is why “at the end of the nineteenth century political 
parties came under attack everywhere”, specifying that “these attacks were not solely a response 
to the parties‟ dysfunctions. They were also a natural product of a certain system of social 
representations” (2011: 30). 
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The same overall conclusion also emerges if we consider the second key feature of party 
democracy i.e. the idea that political legitimacy is purely procedural in the sense that it emerges 
exclusively out of the way in which political decisions are taken and is not tied to any objective 
standard of political „truth‟. Due to the way in which Rosanvallon sets up his conception of 
democratic legitimacy – i.e. as a way of obtaining the most adequate possible representation of 
an elusive „popular will‟ – he implicitly assumes that the basic criterion of political legitimacy 
is already given prior to and independently from the political process.  
This is reflected in the fact that the fundamental critique he moves against the 
“legitimacy of establishment” is that it substitutes a “pragmatic selection procedure” (i.e. 
majoritarian elections) for a criterion of “substantive unanimity”. At the very beginning of his 
chapter on this topic, Rosanvallon writes that: “Since democracy implies that each individual is 
the bearer of fundamental rights, the consent of all is the only incontestable guarantee of respect 
for each … But the underlying requirement of unanimity is broader than this formulation 
implies. There is also a more anthropological interpretation of unanimity, in which unanimity 
symbolizes the organic wholeness of society … Democratic regimes eventually adopted the 
principle of majority rule as a practical procedural necessity, since numerical unanimity was 
virtually impossible to achieve. Yet at the same time they remained under the sway of this older 
idea of substantive unanimity” (2011: 17, italics added). 
This passage shows that Rosanvallon‟s conception of democratic legitimacy remains 
inscribed within the framework of an essentially Rousseauian conception of popular 
sovereignty, according to which the “general will” is an „objective‟ reality, constructed out of 
the particular wills of the individuals concerned, but nonetheless assumed to exist prior to and 
independently from the political process itself. Hence, for Rosanvallon, democratic procedures 
are merely means for „discovering‟ and „approximating‟ a standard of political legitimacy that is 
assumed to precede them. The consequence is that the link between popular sovereignty and the 
formal procedures of majority rule is taken to be merely contingent rather than constitutive of 
the idea of democracy itself.  
This is reflected in the admiration Rosanvallon displays for other ways of manifesting 
the “general will”, beyond popular elections based on the principle of majority rule. Later in the 
same chapter on the “legitimacy of establishment” he writes that: “Popular assemblies were 
originally merely a way of testing and reaffirming the cohesion of the group”, citing as 
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examples the fact that: “in Rome, popular acclamation symbolized the consensus ideal” and that 
“similar rituals of unanimity existed elsewhere, in Germania and Gaul for instance” (Ibid: 18). 
Once again, this is reminiscent of Carl Schmitt‟s idea that individual voting based on the 
principle of majority rule may actually be incompatible with popular sovereignty, because it 
effectively dissolves the unity of the „people‟ at the very moment in which it is supposed to be 
manifested. Rosanvallon, however, gives this reasoning a more „technocratic‟ twist, since he 
goes on to argue that the “legitimacy of identification with generality” and the “legitimacy of 
impartiality” provide more adequate ways of approximating “substantive unanimity”. 
In the final analysis, Rosanvallon‟s apparent indifference and even disregard for the 
formal procedures of parliamentary democracy thus proves to be intimately connected with his 
essentially „epistemic‟ conception of politics, according to which political process is ultimately 
way of discovering and implementing an objective „truth‟ that precedes it. Once we accept the 
assumption that there exists an „objective‟ and pre-political standard of political legitimacy, it 
seems difficult to resist the conclusion that some individuals are more competent than others in 
knowing what this standard requires, and should therefore be entrusted with the responsibility 
for ruling the others.
10
 Conversely, if we start from the assumption that the popular will can 
only be constructed through the political process itself, then it seems more difficult to argue for 
an exclusion of the people concerned from the process of determining it.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our argument above has taken as its starting point the development of populist and 
technocratic forms of discourse within the political life of Western democracies. Whilst often 
                                                 
10
 Such a „technocratic‟ twist to the idea of popular sovereignty was in fact prefigured by Rousseau himself. In the 
chapter of the Social Contract devoted to the equivocal figure of the „Lawgiver‟, he writes that: “By themselves, 
the people always will what is good, but they do not always discern it… They must accordingly be brought to see 
things as they are, and sometimes as they should be seen … Hence the necessity of a Lawgiver”, which is later 
described as an individual of “superior intelligence, who could understand the passions of men without feeling any 
of them, who had no affinity with our true nature but knew it to the full, whose happiness was independent of ours, 
but who would nonetheless make his happiness our concern” (Rousseau 1968: 83-84). In the light of what has been 
stated above it is perhaps not entirely out of place to read this passage as containing many of the same ideas that 
Rosanvallon would later develop with respect to the idea of a “legitimacy of identification with generality” and 
especially a “legitimacy of impartiality”. Moreover, this would appear to be confirmed by the section of his book 
that Rosanvallon devotes to a reconstruction of the idea of an independent bureaucracy in France, which links it to 
a specific appropriation of the Republican ideal of popular sovereignty encapsulated in the notion of a class of 
“jacobins of excellence” (Rosanvallon 2011 pp. 38-43).  
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associated with political developments in Western Europe, we have suggest that these forms of 
discourse are increasingly structuring the way we think about politics across the Western world. 
We noted that it is most common to suppose that populism and technocracy are related to one 
another, if at all, in the sense that one form of discourse is directly opposed to the other. The 
relationship is often framed as one of „backlash‟ or of a „reaction‟ of one against the other. Our 
suggestion has been that whilst points of contention and conflict obviously exist, there is also a 
strong element of complementarity between these two forms of discourse. More specifically, 
whilst „populism‟ and „technocracy‟ are often held to be used as negative labels that one throws 
as one‟s political opponents, we have found that what both forms of discourse are actually 
opposed to is not each other but the political regime of what we call party democracy.  Before 
proceeding any further, we situated party democracy within the burgeoning literature in political 
theory on parties and partisanship. Taking our cue from the work of Muirhead, Rosenblum, 
White, Ypi and others, we defined party democracy in terms of two key features: the political 
mediation by parties of societal divisions; and a proceduralist conception of political legitimacy.  
We substantiated this argument by critically analyzing two texts: Laclau‟s On Populist 
Reason and Rosanvallon‟s Democratic Legitimacy. Both texts were not strictly intended as texts 
that were representative of the way populism and technocracy are understood within political 
theory as a whole. Rather, they were taken as exemplary texts, meaning that they illustrated a 
particular logic or argument in an exceedingly clear and lucid way. In studying the two texts 
alongside one another, we found important parallels. Whilst Laclau defended populism against 
what he saw as the threat of increasingly depoliticized and technocratic forms of politics, the 
substance of what he was criticizing was not technocracy as such – which he conceded could 
never exist in a pure form anyway – but rather party democracy, and in particular its claim to 
providing political mediation and its arbitrary relationship to political truth. Similarly, 
Rosanvallon situated his defence of non-electoral forms of legitimacy as a response to the 
simplifying ways in which „the people‟ had been equated with the majority since the French 
Revolution. Such simplification was not for Rosanvallon a problem of populism but rather was 
a pure product of the regime of party democracy. Whilst adopting normatively opposition 
positions, both Laclau and Rosanvallon were thus found to converge in their shared critique of 
party democracy. Investigating in detail this shared critique, we also found that Laclau and 
Rosanvallon both took issue specifically with the claims about political mediation and 
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procedural rules found in the regimes of party democracy. By putting these two texts together 
and analyzing them on the basis of their complementarity, it becomes clear the ways in which 
populist and technocratic forms of discourse can be considered as two sides of the same coin, 
the coin being the critique of party democracy. Rosanvallon, for instance, is explicit in 
formulating a defence of technocracy that aims to take the side of the people against their 
political leaders and elite. This suggests that in public discourse, arguments about technocracy 
should not be associated only with an elitist disdain for the public; it is also possible to identify 
a more „populist‟ defence of technocracy that draws on the themes identified at a more abstract 
level by Rosanvallon. 
Many implications flow from this argument, not least the one that our understanding of 
the relationship between populism and technocracy should be substantially revised. At the same 
time, our argument about the commonality between populism and technocracy has important 
implications for the way in which we think about party democracy. Most notably, it suggests 
that the idea of contemporary political life being restructured around a new cleavage between 
populism and technocracy actually masks a deeper dimension of political opposition – between 
party democracy and its critics – in terms of which both populism and technocracy find 
themselves on the same side. This implies that if we accept the idea that politics is increasingly 
structured in terms of this conflict between populism and technocracy, then we find that even 
the very possibility of articulating a defense of party democracy is excluded from the political 
spectrum. This, we believe, is something which should be both of practical concern and of 
interest to those scholars within the field of political theory who have been instrumental in 
drawing our attention back towards political parties and their role within democratic political 
life.  
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